The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), also the last comprehensive immigration reforms enacted by Congress, is best known as the product of compromise between pro- and anti-immigrant factions. Today, as pro-immigrant advocates are scrambling to resist the Trump administration’s mass deportation scheme, understanding IRCA’s history may provide the necessary framework to move forward. Headed by MVP author Charles Kamasaki and detailed in his epic book Immigration Reform: The Corpse That Will Not Die, this chapter of MVP’s series on immigration highlights the following lesson: that the right kind of resistance may be the prerequisite to a satisfactory deal.
IRCA began as a much-heralded product of a potent Blue Ribbon government commission. The bill which reflected the commission’s recommendation was introduced in 1982 and described as a “3-legged stool” composed of tougher enforcement, new restrictions on legal immigration and asylum, and a modest legalization program for select unauthorized immigrants. The legislation was endorsed by some 300 newspapers and its swift passage was widely expected.
Even so, a small coalition of Latino civil rights organizations and their pro-immigrant allies thought the bill too weighted towards enforcement and demanded a more balanced approach. After the Senate passed the legislation in 1982, they orchestrated an unorthodox “filibuster by amendment” that killed the bill in the House. During a second attempt in 1983, the Senate again acted swiftly, but opponents convinced the Speaker to delay House action on the bill. In 1984, backed by the civil rights coalition, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus introduced an alternative bill which further delayed consideration and posited amendments that improved IRCA’s legalization program. Still, the 1982 bill passed the House by a razor-thin margin. In an unprecedented maneuver, however, the groups organized opposition to the legislation at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions that summer and paved the way for the bill’s death in the same year.
The key element of that success: the civil rights coalition’s resistance was not an end in itself. Instead, it served the larger goal of producing the best possible outcome for the immigrant families they represented. Even as they resisted the bill through audacious and, in some cases, unprecedented activities, the coalition was always on the lookout for novel ideas and improvements. While publicly opposing the legislation, they continued to meet privately with supporters to seek out and win improvements. Today, “the resistance” opposed to mass deportation policies might consider how to combine audacious tactics while maintaining the spirit of compromise. Resist not simply for the sake of resisting, nor to respond to every injustice. Our resistance must be strategic, always guided by a vision of a more positive achievable future.
In part as a result of the advocates’ efforts, the final bill enacted in 1986 was much improved – provisions reducing legal immigration and restricting asylum were dropped, and the legalization program was greatly expanded. Read Chapter III to understand a key contribution to its success: the introduction of a new policy innovation produced by a “strange bedfellow alliance”. For Kamasaki’s full analysis, buy the book here.
Immigration Reform: The Corpse that Will Not Die 